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NOTE
Houston, We Have a (Liability) Problem
Justin Silver*
The development of private manned space flight is proceeding rapidly; there
are proposals to launch paying passengers before the end of 2014. Given the
historically dangerous nature of space travel, an accident will probably occur
at some point, resulting in passengers’ injury or death. In the event of a law-
suit stemming from such an accident, a court will likely find that a space flight
entity operating suborbital flights is a common carrier, while an entity operat-
ing orbital flights is not. Regardless of whether these entities are common car-
riers, they face a threat of high levels of liability, as well as risks stemming
from an inability to obtain insurance and the escalation of tort litigation costs.
Given that the private manned space flight industry is brand new and can
provide many benefits to the United States and the world, it is important to
protect the industry while it grows. Individual states have attempted to protect
the industry by passing liability immunity statutes, but passing statutes on a
state-by-state basis is insufficient to protect the industry from the liability it
faces. As a result, this Note proposes a national tort liability immunity statute
to shield the industry until it reaches a more advanced stage of development.
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Introduction
Manned space flight is an incredibly complex and dangerous endeavor.
Of the 536 individuals who have travelled into space,1 18, or 3.4 percent,
have died during a mission.2 Until recently, however, all manned space
flights were the province of national governments. As a result, the issue of
tort liability for injury or death of crew members arose infrequently and, in
the United States, only within the bounds of the Federal Tort Claims Act.3
Within the past decade or so, there has been an ever-increasing push for
commercial manned space flight to support and, in some instances, supplant
governmental space flight.
The current proposals for commercial, human space transportation can
roughly be broken down into two categories: suborbital and orbital. Subor-
bital space flights travel with enough speed to pass through the boundary
between earth’s atmosphere and space but do not achieve a high enough
velocity to enter orbit around the earth. Orbital space flights, on the other
hand, achieve a high enough velocity to enter orbit. The extra speed neces-
sary to enter orbit is very difficult and costly to achieve.
Virgin Galactic is at the forefront of commercializing suborbital manned
space flight.4 Scaled Composites and Virgin Galactic have formed a joint
venture, the Spaceship Company, to construct the spacecraft that Virgin Ga-
lactic will use to transport passengers into space.5 Virgin Galactic aims to
build a reusable spacecraft that will carry two crew members and six passen-
gers into space on a suborbital flight.6 Virgin Galactic CEO Sir Richard
Branson is so confident in the safety and success of the craft that he has
1. List of Space Travelers by Name, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_
space_travelers_by_name (last visited Dec. 26, 2013). The number of space travelers cited is
according to Department of Defense criteria. According to Fe´de´ration Ae´ronautique Internati-
onale criteria, 530 individuals have gone into space. Id.
2. List of Spaceflight-Related Accidents and Incidents, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/List_of_spaceflight-related_accidents_and_incidents#Astronaut_fatalities (last visited
Oct. 12, 2013).
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–80 (2006).
4. See Virgin Galactic, http://virgingalactic.com (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
5. History, Virgin Galactic, http://www.virgingalactic.com/overview (last visited Oct.
12, 2013).
6. Id.; Pan Pylas, Branson Gets Kids on Board for First Space Flight, Associated Press,
July 11, 2012, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/branson-gets-kids-board-first-space-
flight.
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reserved tickets on the first flight of SpaceShipTwo for himself and his two
children.7
SpaceX, one of the leading developers of orbital spacecraft,8 has devel-
oped a fully recoverable capsule capable of autonomous operation that can
be configured to transport cargo and passengers into space.9 The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) picked SpaceX as one of
three teams to receive funding through NASA’s Commercial Crew Integrated
Capability (“CCiCap”) program to test and develop the capability of com-
mercial transportation of crew members to the International Space Station
(“ISS”).10 A crewed test flight is scheduled to occur in 2015.11
Additionally, some corporations have proposed other, more exotic
manned launch systems. While not as close to completion, recent proposals
for suborbital point-to-point transportation would allow flights from New
York to Tokyo in as little as ninety minutes.12 For example, XCOR, another
spacecraft manufacturer, has developed a two-seat suborbital spacecraft with
which the company plans to launch tourist flights from multiple locations in
the very near future.13 XCOR expects to use the spacecraft as a test bed to
develop both a reusable orbital vehicle capable of transporting people to a
space station soon14 and a vehicle that can make suborbital point-to-point
flights by around 2030.15
As more and more corporations seek to enter the field of manned space
flight, the attendant likelihood of an accident resulting in injury or death to
passengers will almost certainly increase. If and when such an accident oc-
curs, it is inevitable that aggrieved parties will seek remuneration from both
the space flight entity that provided the transportation and the spacecraft’s
manufacturers. At that point, a court will have to grapple with applying
some very old doctrines to a very new field—including deciding whether the
space flight entity is a common carrier, interpreting state and federal statutes
regulating the private manned space flight industry, and ascertaining what
duty of care the space flight entity must satisfy. The end result could be
massive liability for a still nascent industry.
7. Pylas, supra note 6.
8. See SpaceX, http://www.spacex.com (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
9. Dragon, SpaceX, http://www.spacex.com/dragon (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
10. Candrea Thomas, NASA’s Commercial Crew Program Progressing for Future of U.S.
Human Spaceflight, NASA (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.nasa.gov/exploration/commercial/crew/
ccicap-announcement.html.
11. See id.
12. Alex Davies, The Return of Supersonic Flight Will Revolutionize Travel, Bus. Insider
(Sept. 27, 2012, 10:40 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-return-of-supersonic-flight-
will-revolutionize-travel-2012-8.
13. See Dave Klingler, As Commercial Space Race Intensifies, SpaceX, Virgin Find They
Have Company, ars technica (Aug. 25, 2012, 1:23 PM), http://arstechnica.com/science/2012/
08/as-commercial-space-race-intensifies-spacex-virgin-find-they-have-company.
14. See id.
15. Davies, supra note 12.
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Faced with these dangers, private space flight entities risk liability that
could cause the industry to destruct before it finds steady footing. The liabil-
ity risks are numerous and not limited to entities classified as common car-
riers. Even private carriers will likely face litigation regarding passengers who
are injured or killed. The risks include difficulty finding insurance, costs of
tort litigation, and product liability for parts manufacturers and service
providers.16
One way to provide relief to companies is for the government to enact
limitations on liability. In fact, some state legislatures have already done so.17
Some may question the necessity (or wisdom) of providing immunity from
common carrier liability to such a small and currently niche field. Examin-
ing other dangerous and previously niche industries can increase these con-
cerns. Courts applied common carrier liability to the railroad and aviation
industries from the very beginning of their existence.18 Even with the added
constraints of common carrier liability, however, both railroads and airlines
flourished.
Nonetheless, the issues that manned space flight operators face remain a
concern to many within the industry and beyond. Both wealthy investors
and the federal government are pushing the development of commercial
space flight. The federal government hopes that companies such as SpaceX
will provide much of its low-earth-orbit transportation needs in the near
future.19 Given the current economic climate, the federal and state govern-
ments have a vested interest in promoting the industry’s growth to create
needed jobs and ensure that the United States remains a leading developer of
advanced technology.20 Faced with a stagnant economy and increasing
budget cuts, the federal government still believes the stakes are important
enough to allow NASA to fund commercial programs through Space Act
Agreements21 and to task a group within the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (“FAA”) with regulating and promoting the industry.22
Given these high stakes, this Note argues that Congress should create a
federal statutory regime to limit the space flight industry’s exposure to tort
16. See discussion infra Section I.A.
17. See discussion infra Section II.B.
18. See, e.g., Phila. & Reading R.R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U.S. 468, 485–86 (1853); Smith v.
O’Donnell, 12 P.2d 933, 934 (Cal. 1932).
19. See Commercial Crew Program, NASA, http://commercialcrew.nasa.gov (last visited
Oct. 12, 2013).
20. See Shefali Luthra, Going Private, Space Industry Eyes State’s Open Spaces, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 10, 2012, at A15A, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/10/us/the-private-space-in-
dustry-eyes-texas-land.html?_r=0.
21. See Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., NASAfacts: Commercial Crew Pro-
gram (2013) [hereinafter NASAfacts], available at http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/608888main_
CCP.pdf; Commercial Crew & Cargo Program Office, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/offices/c3po/
home/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
22. Office of Commercial Space Transportation: About the Office, Fed. Aviation Admin.,
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/about (last visited Oct. 12,
2013).
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liability and, in particular, to prevent a court from deeming space flight
entities common carriers. Part I briefly surveys a variety of liability issues
threatening the space flight industry’s viability. It then focuses its inquiry on
a particularly significant source of liability—the law governing common car-
riers—and how a court may apply common carrier law to manned space
flight operations. Part II examines the current liability regimes in place for
rocket launches, how these regimes apply specifically to manned space
flights, and how these regimes may affect the common carrier analysis. Part
III considers the government’s compelling interest in protecting the industry
from tort liability and examines tort liability reform in analogous industries.
Part III also suggests, in more detail than previous proposals by other com-
mentators, that because of the increased risk of liability inherent in classifi-
cation as a common carrier, the United States should establish a time-
limited federal statutory regime waiving tort liability for ordinary negli-
gence, regardless of whether the entity is actually a common carrier. Finally,
Part III examines other possible tort reforms, such as an extension of the
current federal third-party insurance and cross-waiver regime to space flight
participants, but concludes that these alternatives are neither as efficient nor
as effective as a federally mandated tort liability waiver.
I. Liability Issues and Common Carrier Status
This Part examines common carrier liability and its application to
manned space flight operators. Section I.A discusses some liability issues
facing entities apart from common carrier status. Section I.B provides an
overview of the development of common carrier law throughout the United
States. Section I.C argues that, despite what other commentators have
claimed in the past, courts may construe certain manned space flight entities
as common carriers and subject them to higher levels of tort liability.
A. Manned Space Flight Operators Face a Variety of Liability Issues
Private operators looking to fly humans into space face a variety of tort
liability issues.23 Based on past flights, passengers are at a high risk of suffer-
ing injury or death in various ways. For example, in 1971, the entire three-
man crew of Soyuz 11 was killed after a pressure seal of its spacecraft failed
during reentry into the atmosphere after undocking from the Salyut I space
station caused depressurization.24 Additionally, in 1997, an unmanned Rus-
sian Progress resupply spacecraft collided with the Mir space station, causing
one module to depressurize and the space station to spiral out of control
23. This is apart from and in addition to whether a space flight entity will be classified
as a common carrier, which would subject the operators to a higher standard of care and
prevent passengers from signing liability waivers. See discussion infra Sections I.B–C.
24. Edward Clinton Ezell & Linda Neuman Ezell, The Partnership: A History
of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project 147–51 (1978); Bernard Gwertzman, Russians Confirm a
Drop in Pressure Killed 3 Astronauts, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1971, at 1, available at http://select.
nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40E1FFC395C1A7493C0A8178CD85F458785F9.
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and almost deorbit.25 Because the aggregated potential for tort liability
threatens the viability of the space flight industry, it militates in favor of a
new liability regime.26
In general, tort costs present a risk to the small but growing industry
that is still largely supported by wealthy individuals such as Sir Richard
Branson at Virgin Galactic,27 Elon Musk at SpaceX,28 and Robert Bigelow at
Bigelow Aerospace.29 Introducing potentially large and devastating tort costs
while the industry is trying to find its footing could scare off individuals
who would otherwise be willing to place personal fortunes at risk to develop
manned vehicles—especially given that tort costs grew three times as fast as
the U.S. gross domestic product (“GDP”) between 1950 and 2003.30 Moreo-
ver, compared to the development of previous cutting-edge industries such
as airlines and railroads, the potential burden of tort costs is proportionally
larger for commercial space flight.31 Given the industry’s immaturity and
precarious nature, it is much harder to plan for and absorb tort costs while
25. Clay Morgan, Shuttle-Mir 109–11 (2001).
26. See discussion infra Part III.
27. See Virgin Galactic Takes Ownership of Spaceship Co., L.A. Biz (Oct. 8, 2012, 12:53
PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/losangeles/news/2012/10/08/virgin-galactic-takes-owner-
ship-of.html.
28. See Leadership, SpaceX, http://www.spacex.com/about/leadership (last visited Oct.
12, 2013).
29. See Introduction, Bigelow Aerospace, http://www.bigelowaerospace.com/introduc-
tion.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
30. Int’l Bar Ass’n, Excessive Private Litigation: The Impact on Business and
Consumers 1 (2008), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?Documen-
tUid=323EA4B5-105C-4AD5-9EBC-1F13CFE81979.
31. While it is true that the railroads flourished despite their designation as common
carriers, space flight entities face a different situation, which warrants temporarily limiting tort
liability. Initially, companies developing railroads did not actually face heightened exposure to
tort liability. In fact, in 1845 in Britain, only two passengers, out of the millions who travelled,
received damages from a jury verdict for accidental injury. R.W. Kostal, Law and English
Railway Capitalism 1825–1875, at 293 (1994). Whether because of a lack of resources or
something else, people in the mid-nineteenth century were less likely than passengers in 2013
to sue over injuries and receive damages. It was not until later in the nineteenth century, when
passenger railway travel exploded from approximately 174 million passengers in 1861 to 507
million passengers in 1875 in Britain alone, Royal Commission on Railway Accidents, Re-
port of the Royal Commissioners, 1877, H.C. 1637, at 17 (U.K.), available at http://par-
lipapers.chadwyck.com/fullrec/fullrec.do?id=1877-053190&DurUrl=Yes, that tort liability
became a pressing concern for railroads. Kostal, supra, at 293–98, 304–05. With the increase
in passenger travel, the railroads saw a corresponding increase in the willingness of injured
passengers to file suit and of courts and juries to award damages. Id. The space flight industry
faces a very different legal atmosphere than did the fledgling railroads and does not anticipate
carrying anywhere close to as many passengers in the near future. Passengers will be travelling
not merely for the purpose of transportation but for adventure and new, unique experiences.
The railroads, by contrast, provided a network of industrialized travel across nations that
would help connect people from one place to another. By the time railroads faced liability
similar to that space flight operators will face, the industry had grown large enough to handle
the exposure. To place the same level of liability on industries that have different growth pros-
pects and motivations is not ideal or efficient.
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taking the risks needed to develop new vehicles than it was for other indus-
tries, such as railroads.32
Additionally, space flight entities may struggle to find insurance to cover
tort liability at a reasonable cost. Currently, insurance is available to cover
launches and operations of satellites in orbit.33 In fact, as explained below,
the FAA currently requires launch operators to obtain insurance to cover
third-party damage for all launches, manned or unmanned.34 It is unclear,
however, how insurance companies will develop the necessary policies to
cover space flight entities against liability from passengers who suffer
onboard injuries.35 Commentators, such as Paul Ordyna, suggest that it may
be difficult for insurers to adequately cover the industry because it “is so
new that insurers and underwriters know little about the potential risks and
liabilities associated with the activity.”36 Moreover, insurers are at a disad-
vantage because information about these risks is in the hands of the
insured.37
The industry also faces the major risk of product liability for contractors
and subcontractors that provide products and services to launch operators.38
Of the six states that have implemented tort liability immunity for space
flight entities, one does not extend liability protection to manufacturers or
service providers.39 The lack of immunity for manufacturers and service
providers could discourage them from participating in the field because they
would risk shouldering the majority of liability. The general aviation indus-
try exemplifies this possibility: the production of general aviation aircraft
declined from 17,811 planes in 1978 to 899 planes in 1992, due in part to a
large increase in litigation costs.40 While these issues are serious, they are
minor compared to the consequences of being deemed a common carrier.
B. The Law Governing Common Carriers
An entity is usually defined as a common carrier if it presents itself to
the general public as a business willing to transport people or property for
compensation.41 In contrast, a private carrier presents itself as willing to
32. See Kostal, supra note 31, at 2–5.
33. Pamela L. Meredith, Space Insurance Law—With a Special Focus on Satellite Launch
and In-Orbit Policies, 21 Air & Space Law., no. 4, 2008, at 13, 13.
34. 51 U.S.C.A. § 50914(a)–(c) (West 2013); see infra Section II.A.
35. Meredith, supra note 33, at 13.
36. Paul Ordyna, Insuring Human Space Flight: An Underwriter’s Dilemma, 36 J. Space
L. 231, 251 (2010).
37. Id.
38. Michael C. Mineiro, Assessing the Risks: Tort Liability and Risk Management in the
Event of a Commercial Human Space Flight Vehicle Accident, 74 J. Air L. & Com. 371, 397–98
(2009).
39. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2210(d) (West Supp. 2013). For a more in-depth discussion
of states’ tort immunity regimes, see discussion infra Section II.B.
40. See S. Rep. No. 103-202, at *1–2 (1993), available at 1993 WL 484770.
41. 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 2 (2005).
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transport the public only on a case-by-case basis, through specific contracts,
and under a particular set of circumstances.42 Common carriers are held to a
much stricter standard of care than private carriers,43 and they are also not
allowed to enforce contractual waivers of liability.44
Jackson v. Stancil laid out the bedrock three-factor test for common car-
rier status: whether the entity has “[a]n established place of business[,]
[e]ngag[es] in the operation [of air transportation] as a regular business and
not merely as a casual or occasional undertaking[, and has a] [r]egular
schedule of charges.”45 Some other jurisdictions, such as California—which
has a long history of applying common carrier law to new forms of trans-
portation—have employed this test.
For example, in Gradus v. Hanson Aviation, Inc., the California Court of
Appeal held that California follows the same criteria set forth in Stancil, and
it added a fourth factor: whether the carrier advertises to the public at
large.46  In Smith v. O’Donnell, a case from 1932 when passenger air travel
was still in its infancy, the California Supreme Court noted that “[i]f the
craft be employed as a common carrier vehicle, it is not a reason for apply-
ing different rules of liability to say that it and the industry are new.”47 The
court found that the defendant, who operated a sightseeing flight, was a
common carrier even though the flight took off from and landed at the same
airport because the defendant both held himself out to the general public as
willing to transport any person for compensation and had a set place of
business.48 Thus, the court established that it did not matter in determining
common carrier status whether the transportation took passengers to and
from distinct locations.49
Courts also look at the purpose of the passenger transportation in deter-
mining whether an entity is a common carrier. Courts in multiple states
have held that providing transportation as part of an adventure sport—such
as transportation on an aircraft as part of skydiving or transportation on a
raft as part of whitewater rafting—does not make an entity a common car-
rier because the transportation is incidental to the true purpose of the activ-
ity.50 Entities operating other methods of transportation, including
42. Id. § 4.
43. See id. § 514.
44. Id. § 583.
45. 116 S.E.2d 817, 824 (N.C. 1960) (citations omitted). A common carrier does not
have to operate on a set schedule—an air carrier operating only chartered flights may be a
common carrier. Id.
46. 205 Cal. Rptr. 211, 216 (Ct. App. 1984).
47. 12 P.2d 933, 934 (Cal. 1932).
48. O’Donnell, 12 P.2d at 933–34.
49. Id.
50. E.g., Deutsch v. Chubb Grp. of Ins. Cos., No. 95-B-331, 1995 WL 584394, at *3 (D.
Colo. Sept. 29, 1995) (“[A] white-water raft may convey persons from one place to another
but it is not a ‘common carrier.’ ” Rather, the ‘carriage’ by raft and water is ‘merely incidental’
to the purpose of the trip.” (citation omitted)); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 377 (Colo.
1981) (“Free Flight was not engaged in ‘commercial operations’ or acting as a common carrier
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chairlifts51 and amusement park rides, however, are often deemed common
carriers52 because they are open to the general public, have an established
place of business, and advertise set prices.
Most jurisdictions hold that common carriers are liable under a negli-
gence standard with an extremely high duty of care: “the highest degree of
care commensurate with the practical operation of the business.”53
Additionally, some jurisdictions, such as California, give a res ipsa loquitur
in connection with this skydiving flight. . . . Carriage by air was incidental to Free Flight’s
principal business.”); see also Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving Club, Inc., 392 N.W.2d
727, 731 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (“[T]he Skydiving Club’s services are not qualitatively the
same kind as those provided by common carriers . . . .”).
51. E.g., Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 900 (Ct. App.
1992) (“Given the fact Squaw Valley indiscriminately offers its . . . chair lift to the public to
carry skiers at a fixed rate from the bottom to the top of the . . . run, it logically comes within
the . . . definition of a common carrier.”); D’Amico v. Great Am. Recreation, Inc., 627 A.2d
1164, 1166 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (“A common carrier does not lose its status as such
merely because the nature of its services is specialized. All members of the general public who
possess the necessary equipment and expertise may avail themselves of the . . . chair lift.”);
Grauer v. State, 192 N.Y.S.2d 647, 649 (App. Div. 1959) (“The Court below held that the State,
in the operation of its lift, was a common carrier, and we see nothing objectionable in this
finding.”). But see Pessl v. Bridger Bowl, 524 P.2d 1101, 1106–08 (Mont. 1974) (holding that a
chairlift was not a common carrier as specified by statute).
52. E.g., Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 47–48 (Cal. 2005) (“[O]ur conclusion
that the operator of a roller coaster or similar amusement park ride can be a carrier of persons
for reward is consistent with the authority holding that operators of ski lifts are common
carriers, despite the fact that the skiers who ride such lifts are engaged in recreation.”);
O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 89 N.E. 1005, 1007 (Ill. 1909) (holding that an amusement
park is held to the same duty of care when operating a scenic railway as that of a common
carrier). But see, e.g., Harlan v. Six Flags Over Ga., Inc., 297 S.E.2d 468, 469 (Ga. 1982) (hold-
ing that an amusement park ride is not a common carrier because transportation is incidental
to the purpose of the ride); Bregel v. Busch Entm’t Corp., 444 S.E.2d 718, 719 (Va. 1994)
(“Busch Entertainment is not a common carrier because it does not, as a regular business,
undertake for hire to transport persons from place to place.”).
53. Publix Cab Co. v. Fessler, 335 P.2d 865, 868 (Colo. 1959) (“[T]he slightest deviation
from this [highest degree of care] constitutes negligence toward the passenger.”); see also, e.g.,
Cal. Civ. Code § 2100 (West 2010) (“A carrier of persons for reward must use the utmost
care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide everything necessary for that purpose,
and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill.”); Jackson v. United Airlines, Inc.,
No. 3:08CV182, 2009 WL 1036068, at *10–11 (E.D. Va. 2009) (stating that Virginia law holds
common carriers to the highest duty of care); O’Donnell, 12 P.2d at 935 (“[I]t was the duty of
[the carrier] to ‘exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of his passenger[ ]’ . . . .”);
Gradus v. Hanson Aviation, Inc., 205 Cal. Rptr. 211, 216 (Ct. App. 1984) (“A common carrier
does not guarantee the safety of its passengers. The care . . . is the highest that reasonably can
be exercised consistent with the mode of transportation used, and the practical operation of its
business as a carrier.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Commodore Cruise Line, Ltd. v.
Kormendi, 344 So.2d 896, 897–98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (“[U]nder Florida law, a contrac-
tual duty arises between a passenger and common carrier obligating the carrier to transport
the passenger to his or her destination, exercising the highest degree of care and vigilance for
the passenger’s safety.”); Shamblee v. Va. Transit Co., 132 S.E.2d 712, 714 (Va. 1963) (“[A]
common carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers, but it does owe to them the
highest degree of care for their safety.”); Carlton v. Boudar, 88 S.E. 174, 177 (Va. 1916) (hold-
ing that common carriers are held to a high degree of care as opposed to ordinary care). But
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instruction establishing a rebuttable presumption or inference of the car-
rier’s negligence.54
Common carriers cannot protect themselves with passenger waivers of
liability.55 It would be nonsensical to allow an airline or space flight entity to
simply opt out of the duty placed on common carriers. This is because such
a liability waiver would allow a carrier to limit its liability by exploiting the
power it has over a passenger, instead of giving a court the opportunity to
examine whether a higher duty is necessary. If an entity’s transportation of
its customers is incidental to some other activity (such as skydiving), how-
ever, the waiver of liability is enforceable as long as it is not against public
policy.56 For the same reasons a court does not permit a liability waiver,
common carriers likewise cannot rely on an assumption-of-risk defense.57
see N.M. Unif. Jury Instructions—Civil § 13-2108 (2013) (“Ordinary care under the cir-
cumstances is the proper standard of care in New Mexico . . . .”). The development of com-
mon carrier liability during the rise of the railroads and other forms of mass transportation in
the 1800s established the standard that common carriers were not strictly liable but were
instead liable under a negligence standard with an extremely high duty of care. See, e.g., Phila.
& Reading R.R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U.S. 468, 485–86 (1853); Stokes v. Saltonsall, 38 U.S. 181, 190
(1839); McPadden v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 44 N.Y. 478, 478 (1871) (“Although railroad compa-
nies are bound to exercise the utmost care and vigilance for the safety of their passengers, they
are not held to an absolute warranty that the passengers shall not be injured, rendering them
liable in any event, in the absence of negligence.”); Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common-Law
Background of Nineteenth-Century Tort Law, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 1127, 1157–69 (1990).
54. E.g., Hardin v. San Jose City Lines, Inc., 260 P.2d 63, 65 (Cal. 1953) (“[A]n infer-
ence of negligence based on res ipsa loquitur arises in cases where a passenger on a common
carrier is injured as the result of the operation of the vehicle and . . . the carrier is obliged to
meet the inference by evidence sufficient to offset or balance it.”); Gradus, 205 Cal. Rptr. at
216, 220 (stating that California applies conditional res ipsa loquitur to common carriers and
that common carriers are under a duty of the highest reasonable care); Roberts v. Trans World
Airlines, 37 Cal. Rptr. 291, 295–96 (Ct. App. 1964) (stating that res ipsa loquitur applies to
airlines).
55. “[L]imitations of liability in airline tickets issued by a common carrier have uni-
formly been held invalid.” Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 377 (Colo. 1981); see also Curtiss-
Wright Flying Serv., Inc. v. Glose, 66 F.2d 710, 712–13 (3d Cir. 1933) (“[T]he policy of law is
settled that common carriers, in dealing with passengers, cannot compel them to so release
their legal liability for their own negligence.”); Bernard v. U.S. Aircoach, 117 F. Supp. 134,
138–39 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (“It is a basic principle of law that one cannot in advance of doing an
act of negligence, limit his or its liability for the results which flow from the tort of negligence,
nor prescribe conditions for recovery of damages which flow from acts of negligence, even
though there be a contract of carriage by a common carrier.” (citations omitted)); Conklin v.
Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc., 194 N.E. 692, 693–94 (N.Y. 1935) (holding that New York
law prohibits a common carrier from limiting liability for injury or death).
56. See Dressel, 623 P.2d at 377–78 (holding that the exculpatory agreement was valid
because skydiving operator was not a common carrier and the agreement was not against
public policy); Durrell v. Parachutes Are Fun, Inc., No. 85C-AU-82, 1987 Del. Super. LEXIS
1321, at *5–7 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 1987) (stating that an exculpatory agreement between a
skydiver and skydiving company was not against public policy under the law of the State of
Maryland); Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving Club, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 727, 731–32 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that an exculpatory agreement between a skydiver and skydiving club
was valid and not against public policy).
57. Fox v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 565, 568 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (holding that
the defense of assumption of risk is inapplicable to injuries to passengers when traveling on a
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C. Courts Will Construe Certain Manned Space Flight Entities as
Common Carriers
Whether any given space flight entity is a common carrier depends on
the nature of the space flight involved, but it seems reasonably certain that at
least suborbital operations would face common carrier liability. The more
exotic suborbital operations that have been proposed, such as point-to-point
transportation between cities by 2030,58 are most straightforwardly common
carriers. These operations seek to act like traditional air carriers by trans-
porting passengers from one destination to another—just at a faster speed
than current technology permits. Using the logic presented in O’Donnell, the
simple fact that suborbital point-to-point service uses a new technology to
transport passengers from city to city “is not a reason for applying different
rules of liability.”59 A court would most likely apply the framework from
Stancil and Gradus and look at whether the space flight entity has a set place
of business, is in the regular business of space travel, has set prices, and
advertises.60 Given that the point-to-point space flight services would seek to
operate like normal airline services, there is a very high probability that the
space flight entity would, like an airline entity, be deemed a common carrier.
Even if it were providing chartered flights, it might still be a common
carrier.61
A court will also likely deem other suborbital operations that begin
within the next decade, such as suborbital tourist flights,62 common carriers.
Such suborbital proposals appear to meet all the criteria of the Stancil test,
namely, they are setting up businesses and setting standardized prices for
their services.63 For instance, Virgin Galactic advertises a guaranteed set
price of $200,000 on its website and even sells tickets through travel agents.64
It also appears that Virgin Galactic admits the general public and does not
administer a strict fitness test.65 These facts suggest that a court should treat
common carrier); Urban v. Frontier Air Lines, 139 F. Supp. 288, 289 (D. Wyo. 1956) (“[Com-
mon carriers] should exercise the highest degree of care consistent with the practical operation
of the plane and protection of its passengers from injury. It follows that the defense of as-
sumption of risk is without merit.” (citation omitted)); Lopez v. Resort Airlines, Inc., 18
F.R.D. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (“In view of the high degree of care owed by a common carrier
to its passengers there is no basis for the claim of assumption of the risk.” (footnote omitted)).
58. Davies, supra note 12.
59. Smith v. O’Donnell, 12 P.2d 933, 934 (Cal. 1932).
60. Gradus v. Hanson Aviation, Inc., 205 Cal. Rptr. 211, 216 (Ct. App. 1984); Jackson v.
Stancil, 116 S.E.2d 817, 824 (N.C. 1960).
61. Stancil, 116 S.E.2d at 824.
62. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.
63. Stancil, 116 S.E.2d at 824; see also Gradus, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 216 (Ct. App. 1984).
64. Booking, Virgin Galactic, http://www.virgingalactic.com/booking (last visited
Oct. 12, 2013).
65. See Richard Branson, Stephen Hawking on Space, Virgin (Jan. 16, 2012), http://
www.virgin.com/richard-branson/blog/stephen-hawking-on-space. For instance, the company
has already booked a seat for Stephen Hawking. Id. Even if the entity were to forbid certain
individuals from buying a ticket because they lacked specialized skills or had health issues,
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the entity as a common carrier.66 This is true even though the suborbital
flight would take off and land at the same location and would not provide
point-to-point transportation. Sightseeing flights and amusement park
scenic railways have been classified as common carriers in the past.67 It is not
an incredible leap of the imagination to view a suborbital flight as a particu-
larly high sightseeing flight, especially since the entities offer these trips to
the general public at fixed prices.
One of the stronger arguments for designating space flight operators as
common carriers is that other industries, such as railroads, were deemed
common carriers from their inception. During the heyday of the railroad
industry, U.S. courts did not hesitate to designate railroads as common car-
riers.68 Some states even went so far as to revoke judicial discretion on the
issue and codify trains as common carriers.69 In Britain, which had a similar
approach to railway liability, railways asked for a relaxation of the duty of
care they faced as common carriers.70 British railway operators suffered from
increased financial pressure as railway travel became more popular and the
number of payouts to injured passengers grew.71 The British Parliament,
however, rejected the railways’ request for a reduced duty of care.72 The
Royal Commission, which convened to examine railway accidents, decided
not to limit the liability that railways faced for passenger injuries, as it felt
that “the operation of the present law does not cripple the resources of the
companies. . . . If . . . the change be demanded in order to lessen the amount
of what is indirectly a penalty upon negligence, we do not consider that
result desirable in itself.”73
As a common carrier, suborbital space flight entities will face a level of
liability that could cause severe harm to a space flight entity after even a
single accident, much greater than the degree of harm faced by newly
formed railroads in the 1800s. A court will hold the entity to an extremely
courts could still find that the operator was a common carrier. In D’Amico, the court held that
a ski lift was a common carrier even though specialized knowledge and a certain level of fitness
was required to use the lift. D’Amico v. Great Am. Recreation, Inc., 627 A.2d 1164, 1166 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (“A common carrier does not lose its status as such merely because
the nature of its services is specialized. All members of the general public who possess the
necessary equipment and expertise may avail themselves of the . . . chair lift.”).
66. See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Phila. & Reading R.R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U.S. 468, 485–86 (1853); Galena &
Chi. Union R.R. Co. v. Yarwood, 15 Ill. 468, 468–69 (1854); McElroy v. Nashua & Lowell R.R.
Corp., 58 Mass. 400, 400 (1849); McPadden v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 44 N.Y. 478, 483 (1871);
see also James W. Ely, Jr., Railroads and American Law 219–21 (2001); Kaczorowski, supra
note 53, at 1157–60.
69. Ga. Code § 2040 (1861); 1850 Fla. Laws 37, 42–43; Ely, supra note 68, at 181.
70. Kostal, supra note 31, at 306–13.
71. Id. at 293–98, 304–05.
72. Royal Commission on Railway Accidents, supra note 31, at 5–36, 310–13.
73. Id. at 32.
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high standard of care that may be almost impossible to meet given the riski-
ness of space flight. Additionally, entities may not even be able to cover this
risk through insurance and certainly will not be able to require liability
waivers.74 The combination of all these issues makes it almost impossible for
a space flight entity to survive an accident, and the fallout could destroy the
entire industry.
The one subset of space flight operations that common carrier liability
will likely not cover is orbital space flight.75 The current expense of placing
humans into orbit76 suggests that passengers on orbital flights will continue
to negotiate on an individual, contractual basis for the foreseeable future.77
As a result, a court will most likely classify an orbital carrier as a contract or
private carrier and subject it to ordinary negligence standards.78 Other liabil-
ity issues, however, still threaten orbital carriers. Given the lack of knowl-
edge as to the specific risks of space flight, it will be hard for carriers to
74. A space flight entity requiring individuals on a private manned space flight to sign
liability waivers has even appeared in popular culture:
Hermes: Okay, captain, this is just a standard legal release, protecting Planet Express
from lawsuits in the event of the unforeseen.
Leela: [reading] Death by airlock failure.
Hermes: MmmHmm.
Leela: [reading] Death by brain parasite.
Hermes: Yah.
Leela: [reading] Death by sonic diarrhea.
Hermes: Oh ho, you don’t want that.
Leela: Look, I don’t know about any of your previous captains, but I intend to do as
little dying as possible. [She puts the form on the desk and Hermes chuckles. He slides it
back to her.]
Hermes: Sign the paper.
Futurama: The Series Has Landed (FOX television broadcast Apr. 4, 1999). The waiver that
Leela must sign also illustrates one of the issues with the current, state-level immunity statutes
that only cover the “inherent risks” of space flight. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
Although Hermes and Planet Express, Inc. are very familiar with the risks of intergalactic space
flight due to their high level of experience, in 2013, as compared to the year 3000, the manned
space flight industry is in its infancy and the risks may still be largely unknown.
75. See generally supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text.
76. Private flights to the ISS that are offered by Space Adventures on a Soyuz capsule
currently cost $50 million a seat. Jesse McKinley, Out of This World!, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 2012,
at TR1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/travel/space-tourism-is-here-wealthy-
adventurers-wanted.html?pagewanted=all. NASA also recently signed a contract with the Rus-
sian space agency to transport twelve astronauts to the ISS for a total of $753 million or $62.75
million an astronaut. David Weaver & Josh Buck, NASA Extends Crew Flight Contract with
Russian Space Agency — Administrator Bolden Repeats Call for American-Made Commercial
Alternative (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2011/mar/HQ_C11-013_
Soyuz_Contract.html.
77. See David Kravets, Wannabe Tourist Wants $21 Million Back over Scuttled Mission,
WIRED (Sept. 24, 2008), http://www.wired.com/science/space/news/2008/09/enomoto_law-
suit; see also Enomoto v. Space Adventures, Ltd., 624 F. Supp. 2d 443 (E.D. Va. 2009).
78. See, e.g., Smith v. O’Donnell, 12 P.2d 933, 934 (Cal. 1932) (“The Supreme Court of
that state determined that [the carrier] was not operating his craft as a common carrier, but as
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predict what behavior a court will deem negligent. Other issues, such as a
possible lack of available insurance, could also pose a threat to orbital
carriers.
II. The Current Liability Regime
The tort liability regime in the United States for commercial space flight
companies is currently divided across federal,79 state,80 and international81
jurisdictions. The legal regime is only forty-five years old, with the first
treaty governing space law passed in 196782 and the most recent state law
passed in 2012.83 Sections II.A and II.B examine the current space flight tort
liability regimes at the federal and state levels, respectively.84 Section II.C
examines how these regimes would fail to shield space flight entities from
common carrier liability.
A. Current Federal Space Flight Tort Liability Regime
The federal government has enacted a semi-comprehensive regime regu-
lating private manned space launches in the United States through the Com-
mercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 (“CSLAA”). The CSLAA is
the latest major, substantive addition to the line of statutes governing private
space flight, which began with the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984
(“CSLA”).85 The CSLAA delineates the extent of the FAA’s authority to
a private carrier of passengers, basing its decision largely upon the grounds that the trips in the
air were made by special arrangement, and that he did not and would not take all who ap-
plied.”); Jackson v. Stancil, 116 S.E.2d 817, 822–24 (N.C. 1960).
79. 51 U.S.C.A. §§ 50901–23 (West 2013); 14 C.F.R. §§ 400.1–460.53 (2013).
80. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2210–12 (West Supp. 2013); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-6-101
(2013); Fla. Stat. § 331.501 (2013); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-14-2 to -4 (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 228 (end) of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 51st Leg. (2013)); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. §§ 100A.001–.003 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2013 3d Called Sess. of the
83d Leg.); Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-227.8 to .10 (2007 & Supp. 2013).
81. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, art. VI, Jan. 14,
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15; Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S 187; Agreement on the
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into
Outer Space, art. V, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119; Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. VII, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
82. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 81.
83. Leonard David, Private Space Travel Gets a Big Boost in California, Space.com (Sept.
21, 2012, 5:45 PM), http://www.space.com/17720-private-spaceflight-liability-california-law.
html.
84. Because this Note focuses on the domestic issue of common carrier liability, it will
omit a discussion of liability at an international level.
85. See 51 U.S.C.A. §§ 50901–23 (West 2013) (formerly codified at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 70101–21 (2006)); Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
492, 118 Stat. 3974; Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055 (1984)
(amended 2004); see also, e.g., 51 U.S.C. § 50901 note (Supp. V 2011) (Historical and Revision
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regulate manned space flight.86 The CSLAA also gives the FAA authority to
promote the safety of launch vehicles by requiring FAA-issued licenses and
permits for launches and reentries.87 While the licensing process applies to
all launches, manned and unmanned, the FAA is prohibited from issuing
regulations “governing the design or operation of a launch vehicle to protect
the health and safety of crew and spaceflight participants” before October 1,
2015, unless an event occurs on a manned flight that “result[s] in a serious
or fatal injury” or “pose[s] a high risk of causing a serious or fatal injury.”88
The statute currently requires a licensee to obtain liability insurance or
show financial responsibility for the “maximum probable loss from claims,”
as determined by the FAA, for injuries to third parties and the U.S. govern-
ment.89 The term “third party” specifically excludes crew members and
space flight participants, meaning that operators are not required to insure
these individuals.90 The third-party launch insurance must protect the licen-
see, the government, executive agencies, and all contractors, subcontractors,
and customers from damage inflicted on third parties, such as individuals
on the ground.91 Licensees are also required to sign reciprocal waivers of
claims with the government, contractors, subcontractors, and customers
stating that each party agrees to be personally responsible for any death,
injury, or damage to its respective employees or property.92 The federal gov-
ernment also provides indemnification for all damages to third parties up to
Notes) (identifying the modern law’s origins in the CSLA). The Department of Transportation
has delegated regulatory authority to the FAA. Commercial Space Transportation; Licensing
Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,289 (June 13, 2003). There is some controversy over whether the
federal government’s regulation establishes sole federal jurisdiction over tort claims relating to
private space flight, but this question is beyond the scope of this Note. For an overview, see
generally R. Bender, Space Transport Liability 97–125 (1995). Although the CSLAA and
corresponding regulations govern many aspects of private space flight, this Section only exam-
ines the statutes and regulations that pertain to tort liability of flights, both manned and
unmanned, and any other regulations that pertain to manned space flight in particular.
86. 150 Cong. Rec. 24334 (2004) (statement of Rep. Dana Rohrabacher).
87. 51 U.S.C.A §§ 50904–06 (West 2013).
88. Id. § 50905(c). The FAA has released a draft document outlining “established prac-
tices” concerning safety for human space flight, but this document does not delineate detailed
safety requirements for space flight entities and does not provide draft regulations. Fed. Avia-
tion Admin., Draft Established Practices for Human Space Flight Occupant Safety
with Rationale (2013), available at http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_of-
fices/ast/media/Draft_Established_Practices_for_HSF_Occupant_Safety_with_Rationale.pdf.
89. Id. § 50914(a)–(c). The insurance required cannot exceed $500 million for third-
party claims and $100 million for government claims or, alternatively, “the maximum liability
insurance available on the world market at reasonable cost” if it is less than the calculated
“maximum probable loss.” Id. § 50914(a)(3).
90. Id. § 50902(21)(E). The failure to require insurance for these parties could leave the
entities directly liable for any injuries, particularly if they are otherwise unable to find
insurance.
91. 51 U.S.C.A. § 50914(a)(4).
92. Id. § 50914(b)(1)–(2).
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$1.5 billion above the maximum probable loss (as adjusted for inflation), as
long as the loss was not due to “willful misconduct by the licensee.”93
The finalized regulations for manned space flight, completed in 2006,
also include specific disclosure and waiver requirements.94 The FAA regula-
tions require that, before entering into an agreement for a launch or receiv-
ing compensation, licensees must inform space flight participants, in an
easily understood, written format, of all known hazards, the possible exis-
tence of unknown hazards, and the possibility that space flight could result
in injury or death.95 The operator must inform participants that the govern-
ment has not certified the launch vehicle, and it must provide information
on the safety record of all launch vehicles ever used in manned flights as well
as the record of the operator’s specific launch vehicle.96 Space flight partici-
pants must also be able to inquire orally about the dangers of space flight
and must provide written, signed, and dated consent.97 They are also re-
quired to sign a reciprocal waiver of claims with the United States.98 Space
flight operators must train space flight participants “on how to respond to
emergency situations,”99 but the regulations have not yet defined the scope
of this required training.100
Some members of Congress protested the limited authority given to the
FAA, arguing that it created too large a risk of death or injury for space flight
participants.101 Others felt, however, that the bill “[struck] a delicate balance
between the need to give a new industry a chance to develop brand-new
technology and the desire to provide enough regulation to protect the indus-
try’s customers.”102 The bill gained wide support because it gave clear au-
thority to the FAA to regulate manned space flight for the first time,
protected third parties from harm, and set a clear timetable for when the
FAA would be able to regulate safety aspects of manned launch vehicles.103
93. Id. § 50915. In the event of an accident, the indemnification regime would not
interact with state-level immunity for space flight participants, as the indemnification only
applies to third parties and not to space flight participants. Id.
94. Human Space Flight Requirements, 14 C.F.R. pt. 460 (2013).
95. 14 C.F.R. § 460.45(a).
96. Id. § 460.45(b)–(d).
97. Id. § 460.45(f).
98. Id. § 460.49.
99. Id. § 460.51.
100. See id.; see also Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Par-
ticipants, 70 Fed. Reg. 77,262, 77,271 (Dec. 29, 1995) [hereinafter Human Space Flight NPRM]
(containing similarly vague language in proposing rulemaking ahead of promulgation of cur-
rent regulation). Only one case, Martin Marietta Corp. v. International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization, has interpreted any provision of the CSLAA. 991 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1992)
(amended 1993). The court held that Congress did not intend for the reciprocal waivers of
claim to apply retroactively or to protect parties from liability for grossly negligent behavior.
Id. at 100.
101. E.g., 150 Cong. Rec. 24,334 (2004) (statement of Rep. James Oberstar).
102. E.g., id. at 24,335 (statement of Rep. Sherwood Boehlert).
103. See id.
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B. Current State-Level Space Flight Tort Liability Regimes
The development of space flight liability statutes at the state level is a
relatively recent phenomenon, with the first immunity statute passed by Vir-
ginia in 2007104 and the latest passed by California in 2012.105 The states that
have passed or are considering space flight immunity statutes seek to attract,
encourage the development of, and retain commercial space launch compa-
nies within their borders.106 Six states have passed space flight immunity
statutes.107 All of these states require the space flight entity operating the
launch to provide a warning statement to space flight participants in addi-
tion to the one required by federal law.108 All of these states also strip liabil-
ity protection from any space flight entity that fails to comply with the
statutory warning requirements.109
While the six state immunity statutes are similar in many ways, it is
worth reviewing some key differences in the legal protections each statute
provides to the commercial space transportation industry. A majority of the
six states that have passed space flight immunity statutes—Florida, Colo-
rado, Texas, Virginia, and New Mexico—define a space flight entity that is
entitled to liability protection as any entity that holds a license or authoriza-
tion from the FAA to conduct or participate in manned space flight or any
supplier of parts or services used by an entity subject to FAA licensing.110
Texas additionally specifies that the protection applies to officers, owners,
104. Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-227.8 to .10 (2007 & Supp. 2013); Paul Alp, Limitations on
Liability as to Space Tourists, ABA Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. Committee News, Summer 2011,
at 1, 10, available at http://www.crowell.com/files/2011-Limitations-On-Liability-As-To-Space-
Tourists.pdf.
105. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2210–12 (West Supp. 2013); David, supra note 83.
106. The Prof’l Staff of the Fla. Judiciary Comm., Florida Senate Bill Analysis
and Fiscal Impact Statement, Comm. Substitute for S.B. 2438, 2008 Reg. Sess., at 1–3
(2008), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?File
Name=2008s2438.ju.doc&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=2438&Session=2008; Alp,
supra note 104, at 10; P.J. Blount, If You Legislate It, They Will Come: Using Incentive-Based
Legislation to Attract the Commercial Space Industry, 22 Air & Space Law., no. 3, 2009, at 19,
21; David, supra note 83.
107. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2210–12; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-6-101 (2013); Fla. Stat.
§ 331.501 (2013); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-14-2 to -4 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 228 (end) of
the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 51st Leg. (2013)); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§§ 100A.001–.003 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2013 3d Called Sess. of the 83d Leg.);
Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-227.8 to .10.
108. Cal. Civ. Code § 2211(a); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-6-101(3)(a) to (b); Fla. Stat.
§ 331.501(3)(a)–(b); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-4(A); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 100A.003; Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-227.10(A) to (B).
109. Cal. Civ. Code § 2211(b); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-6-101(3)(c); Fla. Stat.
§ 331.501(3)(c); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-4(B); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 100A.002; Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-227.10(C).
110. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 41-6-101(1) to (2)(a); Fla. Stat. § 331.501(1)(c); N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§ 41-14-2(J), 41-14-3(A); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 100A.001(4); Va.
Code Ann. § 8.01-227.8.
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and employees of a space flight entity, as well as to spacecraft and part man-
ufacturers. Texas also denies plaintiffs the ability to seek injunctive relief.111
California does not extend immunity to spacecraft or parts manufacturers
and specifically denies immunity for product defects.112 New Mexico has also
recently passed legislation to extend protection to spacecraft and parts man-
ufacturers.113 The New Mexico statute denies immunity to any space flight
entity that does not acquire at least $1 million in insurance covering all
space flight activities.114
States also vary in the level of immunity they provide to the designated
space flight entity. Five of the six states that provide immunity—California,
Florida, Colorado, New Mexico, and Virginia—provide immunity for death
or injuries that result from “inherent risks” or simply “risks” associated with
space flight activities.115 Virginia and California define injury to specifically
include emotional injury and property damage as well, as long as these
harms still result from an “inherent risk.”116 Texas, on the other hand, pro-
vides blanket immunity for the death of or any injury to a space flight par-
ticipant, including emotional injury, damage to property, or any other loss,
regardless of whether it is an “inherent risk” or not.117 Texas also specifically
notes that an agreement limiting liability between a participant and an entity
“is effective and enforceable and is not unconscionable or against public
policy.”118
All states, however, deny immunity for injuries caused by grossly negli-
gent behavior, willful or wanton disregard, or intentional misconduct.119
Florida, Colorado, and California also remove liability protection if the
space flight entity knew or reasonably should have known of a dangerous
condition that caused injury.120 Finally, multiple states have enacted
expiration dates for their immunity statutes. Florida and Virginia originally
111. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 100A.001(4), 100A.002(c).
112. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2210(d), 2212(e).
113. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-14-2(J), 41-14-3(A).
114. Id. § 41-14-3(C).
115. Cal. Civ. Code § 2212(b); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-6-101(1) to (2)(a) (2013); Fla.
Stat. § 331.501(2)(a); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-3; Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-227.9(A).
116. Cal. Civ. Code § 2210(b); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-227.8.
117. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 100A.001(6) (definition); id. § 100A.002
(limitation on liability).
118. Id. § 100A.004.
119. Cal. Civ. Code § 2212; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-6-101(2)(b); Fla. Stat.
§ 331.501(2)(b); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-3; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 100A.002(b); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-227.9(B).
120. Cal. Civ. Code § 2212; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-6-101; Fla. Stat. § 331.501(2)(b).
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included sunset provisions121 but removed them before they took effect.122 In
New Mexico, the statutory immunity will be automatically repealed on July
1, 2018.123
Altogether, the split between federal- and state-level regulation of the
commercial space flight industry presents a fractured and confusing
landscape.
C. Despite These Regulations, Space Flight Entities Would Be Subject to
Common Carrier Liability
Due to these regulations, most commentators on space flight tort liabil-
ity have ignored or rejected the idea of deeming a space flight operator a
common carrier. Michael Mineiro, for example, dismisses the issue as one
that will not matter for some time and argues that a court will consider the
transportation incidental to the activity of visiting space.124 Since incidental
transportation providers are not common carriers, they are therefore subject
to a lower duty of care and can generally enter into exculpatory agree-
ments.125 Some scholars argue that a court would be unlikely to consider an
orbital space flight entity a common carrier in light of the FAA’s official
interpretation of the CSLAA. The FAA notes that Congress used “space
flight participant” rather than “space flight passenger” in the CSLAA,
thereby “signif[ying] that someone on board a launch vehicle or reentry
vehicle is not a typical passenger with typical expectations of transport, but
someone going on an adventure ride.”126 One could make a similar argu-
ment against common carrier status under state laws as well because all the
states that have implemented tort immunity statutes also use the term “space
flight participant” or simply “participant.”127
121. Comm. Substitute for S.B. 2438, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2008 Fla. Laws ch. 180,
available at http://laws.flrules.org/files/Ch_2008-180.pdf; Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-227.8 to .10
(2007); H.B. 3184, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007).
122. S.B. 652, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2011 Fla. Laws ch. 153, available at http://laws.
flrules.org/2011/153; Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-227.8 to .10 (Supp. 2013); H.B. 21, 2010 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010); S.B. 189, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010).
123. S.B. 9, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2010).
124. Mineiro, supra note 38, at 377–78.
125. See, e.g., supra note 56 and accompanying text.
126. Human Space Flight NPRM, supra note 100, at 77, 269–70; see also Tracey Knut-
son, What Is “Informed Consent” for Space-Flight Participants in the Soon-to-Launch Space
Tourism Industry?, 33 J. Space L. 105, 109–10 (2007) [hereinafter Knutson, Informed Consent];
Letter from Tracey Knutson, Knutson & Assocs., to Fed. Aviation Admin., Comments Regard-
ing Docket Number FAA-2005-23449 (Feb. 27, 2006) (on file with the FAA), available at http:/
/www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480d9ce0d&disposition=attach-
ment&contentType=pdf.
127. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 2210(a) (West Supp. 2013); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-6-
101(1)(c) (2013); Fla. Stat. § 331.501(1)(a) (2013); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-2(D) (West,
Westlaw through Ch. 228 (end) of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 51st Leg. (2013)); Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code Ann. § 100A.001(5) (West, Westlaw end of the 2013 3d Called Sess. of the 83d
Leg.); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-227.8 (2007 & Supp. 2013); see also 51 U.S.C.A. § 50905(17)
(West 2013).
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But this argument is not determinative. The CSLAA allows the FAA to
regulate safety for human space flight on a case-by-case basis until either
October 1, 2015, or until there is an accident that poses a high risk of or
causes injury or death, but this is not the end of the story.128 The federal
statutory regime also specifically allows states to implement more stringent
regulations as long as they remain consistent with the federal regime.129 Be-
cause states are allowed to impose stricter regulations, a state court would
likely be within its power to define a space flight entity as a common carrier.
Furthermore, Congress has also proposed replacing the phrase “space flight
participant” with “passenger,”130 which would weaken the argument against
common carrier classification.
The states’ statutory language can also affect common carrier classifica-
tion. At the state level, five of the six states that have implemented space
flight immunity statutes only provide liability protection for “inherent risks”
or “risks” of space flight activities.131 The term “inherent risk,” as defined in
cases concerning treatments in the medical field and sports law, would not
cover simple negligence or gross negligence on the part of the space flight
entity.132 Inherent risks do not include the risk of negligence, as there is an
assumption that an inherent risk is something that occurs regardless of
whether the actor is negligent.133 Given that the space flight industry is
brand new, it is hard to predict what a court would consider an inherent risk
of space travel as opposed to negligent behavior on the part of the entity.
This is true especially because the FAA currently enjoys little latitude to pro-
mulgate regulations. If a court determines that an accident was not an inher-
ent risk and then has to consider whether the space flight entity was
negligent, the court could hold the entity to an incredibly high duty of care
if it also determines that the entity is a common carrier.
It is also unclear how a court will interpret the FAA’s requirement that
entities disclose all known hazards or how that regulation will interact with
state-level immunity statutes.134 The risk of a court holding that a manned
space flight operator is a common carrier drives up the liability risk for the
industry tremendously and could cause the industry to crumble prema-
turely, particularly because the specific hazards that passengers face are often
unknown.
128. 51 U.S.C.A. § 50905(c) (West 2013).
129. Id. § 50919(c).
130. FAA Reauthorization and Reform Act of 2011, H.R. 658, 112th Cong. § 1001 (as
introduced in the House of Representatives, Feb. 11, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr658ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr658ih.pdf.
131. See supra notes 115–118 and accompanying text.
132. See Knutson, Informed Consent, supra note 126, at 109–10; see also 1 Dan B.
Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts § 240 (2d ed. 2011).
133. 1 Dobbs et al., supra note 132, at § 240.
134. See 14 C.F.R. § 460.45(a) (2013).
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III. Liability Reform
This final Part explores how designation as a common carrier may affect
manned space flight entities and proposes possible solutions to prevent tort
liability issues from irreversibly harming the industry. Section III.A argues
that the federal government has an interest in preventing the collapse of the
manned space flight industry. Section III.B examines how the federal gov-
ernment instituted tort liability reform for the general aviation industry and
argues that those methods would not be as effective in the space flight con-
text. Section III.C proposes that the most effective and efficient solution is to
implement a time-limited tort liability immunity statute at the federal level.
A. Federal Governmental Interest in Preventing Industry Collapse
The federal and various state governments have a vested interest in en-
suring the survival of commercial space flight operators—as do the opera-
tors themselves; they also have a lot of money on the line. Several states have
spent large sums of money to build infrastructure, such as spaceports, to
support the industry and attract business.135 They have also provided incen-
tives, such as tax rebates, to launch operators.136 Even more importantly,
NASA’s continuing existence depends to some extent on the success of com-
mercial space flight operators. NASA is pouring tons of money into the cof-
fers of commercial space flight operators to “develop space transportation
systems that can safely launch astronauts to the International Space Station
(ISS) and other low-Earth orbit destinations.”137 NASA has spent over $1.4
billion to date developing these capabilities and, without them, would rely
almost entirely on foreign powers to access low-earth orbit.138 While the fed-
eral government is interested in orbital space flight, it is also unlikely that
private orbital proposals such as Bigelow Aerospace’s private space stations
will become a reality in the near future because it will be impossible to reach
the stations without governmental help and protection.139
The federal government is also interested in suborbital space flight in
part because it wants to decrease the price of access to space. Suborbital
space transportation can provide a new and much cheaper way of accessing
outer space, even if it is for a much shorter period of time than orbital space
135. E.g., Ann Schrader, Stars Were Aligned for New Mexico’s Spaceport, Denver Post
(June 27, 2010, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_15382596.
136. Fed. Aviation Admin., State Support for Commercial Space Activities 4
(n.d.), available at http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/State
%20Support%20for%20Commercial%20Space%20Activities.pdf.
137. See NASAfacts, supra note 21, at 1–2.
138. Id. at 2; Dan Leone, Commercial Crew Budget Shortfall Likely to Lengthen NASA’s
Reliance on Russian Soyuz, SpaceNews (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.spacenews.com/article/
commercial-crew-budget-shortfall-likely-lengthen-nasas-reliance-russian-soyuz.
139. See Irene Klotz, Space Taxi Delays Spur Bigelow Aerospace Layoffs, Reuters, Oct.
20, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/uk-space-business-bigelow-id
USLNE79J01T20111020.
854 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:833
transportation. A study by the FAA and the Tauri Group forecasts that sub-
orbital revenue will total around $600 million over the next ten years but
could optimistically reach as high as $1.6 billion.140 While the report fore-
casts that individuals will account for the majority of the demand for seats
on suborbital flights, it expects that governmental sources looking for new
and cheaper ways to access space will constitute around 10 percent of the
demand.141 Additionally, early participants in suborbital space flight could
“significantly—and rapidly—increase demand,” which might drive down
the price of flights even further.142 To lower costs and increase demand, the
government must support this sector of the industry.
Additionally, current suborbital vehicles could hasten the development
of suborbital point-to-point transportation. Suborbital point-to-point trans-
portation is generally viewed as a way to transport wealthy passengers and
high-value cargo long distances in extremely short periods of time.143 NASA
and the Department of Defense, however, also see it as a way of moving
troops and other cargo around the globe.144 Although these services are not
expected to begin until 2020 at the earliest,145 corporations and the United
States will not be able to take advantage of the possible future benefits of
point-to-point transportation if they do not develop suborbital vehicles
now.
B. Previously Instituted Methods of Tort Liability Protection Would Not Be
as Effective in the Manned Space Flight Context
Given the government’s interest in protecting the nascent space flight
industry, it might seem obvious to apply a previously used liability shield in
the space flight context. For example, product liability caused a massive drop
in general aviation aircraft production and had a disproportionate effect on
general aviation manufacturers. This was partly due to the fact that the air-
craft were so well built that the service life surpassed expectations and re-
sulted in continued liability long after it was expected to cease.146 In
response, the federal government enacted the General Aviation Revitaliza-
tion Act of 1994 (“GARA”) “[t]o amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to
establish time limitations on certain civil actions against aircraft manufac-
turers.”147 As President Clinton stated upon signing GARA, the Act was “in-
tended to give manufacturers of general aviation aircraft and related
140. The Tauri Grp., Suborbital Reusable Vehicles: A 10-Year Forecast of Mar-
ket Demand 7 (2012), available at http://www.taurigroup.com/files/Suborbital_Reusable_Ve-
hicles_A_10_Year_Forecast_of_Market_Demand.pdf.
141. See id. at 6, 40–41.
142. See id. at 88.
143. Id. at 82.
144. Id.
145. Davies, supra note 12.
146. S. Rep. No. 103-202 at *3 (1994), available at 1993 WL 484770.
147. Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552, 1552–54 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 note (2006) (General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994)).
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component parts some protection from lawsuits alleging defective design or
manufacture after an aircraft has established a lengthy record of operational
safety.”148 GARA provided tort liability protection to aircraft and parts man-
ufacturers by establishing an eighteen-year statute of repose, prohibiting
“civil action[s] for damages for death or injury to persons or damage to
property” caused by an accident in an aircraft that holds fewer than twenty
passengers and is not “engaged in scheduled passenger-carrying operations
. . . at the time of the accident,”149 with some exceptions.150 The Act super-
seded any conflicting state laws permitting a civil action for damages.151
GARA, however, is better suited for mature industries like general avia-
tion as opposed to an immature and developing industry like commercial
manned space flight. A statute of repose is useful in the general aviation
industry due to the longevity of the products, which pose a liability risk for
an extended period. Implementing a statute of repose for general aviation
aircraft helped the industry better anticipate how long it would have to face
liability when developing a product that leaves the hands of the product
developer and is operated by the consumer. For space flight entities, on the
other hand, the window in which they face the risk of causing injury or
death to each individual space flight participant is short, and the entity is in
control of the product at all times. Commercial space flight operators do not
have to worry about the possibility of liability hanging over their heads for
years, but they instead face the possibility of a single devastating claim while
they are still developing. A statute of repose solves an issue for industries
that have a mature product that they expect to last a long time rather than
an industry that is developing a new, dangerous, and risky product.
Another possible solution—extending the current CSLAA launch in-
demnification system to include a waiver of claims between space flight par-
ticipants and a space flight entity152—while tempting, would not be as
efficient as a time-limited tort liability immunity statute. Extending the
launch indemnification system to space flight participants would require
participants to sign waivers with all parties to a manned launch to waive any
personal claims for injury or death.153 Although the cross-waiver system
would achieve the same result as a federal tort immunity statute, the former
method would be much more complex and time consuming.
148. Statement on Signing the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 30 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 1678, 1678 (Aug. 17, 1994).
149. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994); see also Alter
v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 531, 542 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (granting summary
judgment to the defendant based on the fact that the purpose of GARA was to establish a
statute of repose that protected general aviation manufacturers from long-term liability); S.
Rep. No. 103-202, at *3, available at 1993 WL 484770 (“The reported bill responds to this
problem by enacting a statute of repose for aircraft and component manufacturers.”).
150. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994).
151. Id.
152. 51 U.S.C.A. § 50914(b)(1)–(2) (West 2013); 14 C.F.R. § 460.49 (2013).
153. 51 U.S.C.A. § 50914(b)(1)–(2); 14 C.F.R. § 460.49.
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The current launch indemnification system, as applied to current third-
party liability, makes sense, as it involves contracting between large, sophisti-
cated entities that are accustomed to entering into contracts of this nature
every time they launch a satellite. Additionally, satellite launches take a long
time to plan and happen relatively infrequently, making the signing of waiv-
ers a relatively simple part of the process.154 For space flight participants, on
the other hand, the process would prove much more difficult to manage, as
the expected number of launches is much higher and the parties would not
be accustomed to signing complex waivers. An extended cross-waiver would
be difficult to implement because space flight participants would need to
sign waivers with all the component manufacturers as well as the space flight
entity. Finally, waivers would be open to a greater number of case-by-case
legal challenges about what had been waived. Regardless of the method cho-
sen to protect the industry, liability generally poses a great threat to the
growth and continued existence of manned space flight entities.
C. Federal Legislation Is the Most Efficient Solution to Limit Tort Liability
Given the real possibility that a court may classify a space flight entity as
a common carrier, Congress should adopt legislation that states that space
flight entities are not common carriers and that limits liability for all such
entities, even private carriers, at the federal level. Unlike the alternatives dis-
cussed in Section III.B, this proposed legislation would provide the greatest
possible protection for the nascent space flight industry. Designating a space
flight entity as a common carrier could subject the entity to a duty of care
that may be almost impossible to meet due to the dangerous nature of space
travel. Authors such as Michael Mineiro propose “a unified tort liability re-
gime, on both a national and international level,” instead of allowing tort
liability to rest on a shaky foundation split between the states, federal gov-
ernment, and international community.155 What Mineiro and others fail to
do, however, is explain what this regime would look like in either the short
or long term. The simplest and most effective reform would be a national
tort liability immunity statute modeled after one of the immunity statutes
adopted at the state level.156 The liability immunity would not be permanent.
Rather, the legislation would be time limited to allow the industry to explore
154. For example, less than fifty satellites were launched worldwide in 2012 and less
than fifty were planned or completed for 2013 when this Note was in production. Completed
Satellite Launches in 2012, SATLAUNCH.net, http://www.satlaunch.net/p/launches-in-2012.
html (last updated Dec. 12, 2012); Completed Satellite Launches 2013, SATLAUNCH.net, http:/
/www.satlaunch.net/p/launches-in-2013.html (last updated Sept. 30, 2013); Planned Satellite
Launches 2013, SATLAUNCH.net, http://www.satlaunch.net/p/launch-schedule-2013.html
(last updated Oct. 8, 2013).
155. Mineiro, supra note 38, at 401.
156. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2210–12 (West Supp. 2013); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-6-101
(2013); Fla. Stat. § 331.501 (2013); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-14-2 to -4 (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 228 (end) of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 51st Leg. (2013)); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. §§ 100A.001–.003 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2013 3d Called Sess. of the
83d Leg.); Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-227.8 to .10 (2007 & Supp. 2013).
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new technologies without the risk of potentially devastating liability that
would limit development before space flight has developed into true mass
transportation. Since the FAA already has national regulatory power over
commercial human space flight activities within the United States,157 it
would simplify, consolidate, and extend the current regulatory scheme if all
regulation of tort liability occurred at a federal rather than state level.
A federal tort liability immunity statute would ideally correct some of
the problems with the state statutes as well. It should remove the reference
to “inherent risks” of space flight158 and instead provide immunity for inju-
ries or death to space flight participants for anything up to and including
negligent conduct by the space flight entity. The federal statute should also
specifically state that the space flight entity is not to be considered a com-
mon carrier for tort liability purposes in order to supersede explicitly any
contrary argument at the state level. The federal statute should allow recov-
ery for grossly negligent or reckless behavior and intentional misconduct.
The statute would thus provide a level of protection similar to that currently
provided by the Texas statute.159
The federal statute should also provide an expiration date for this im-
munity, as states have done,160 to ensure that the immunity is lifted once the
industry is on secure footing. Rather than setting a fixed sunset date, it may
make more sense to base the expiration of immunity on the occurrence of a
particular event, such as after a certain number of commercial space
flights—either total or per year—or when ticket prices drop below a set
level. This would avoid the difficulty of predicting ex ante how long it will
take for the space flight industry to mature. The expiration could also hinge
on the method of space flight rather than time. These measures may better
indicate the maturity of the industry than a strict time limit would. Imple-
menting these reforms at a federal level would reshape the currently frac-
tured space flight tort liability regime into a more streamlined and coherent
system.
Conclusion
The United States stands to reap great benefits from the development of
a private manned space flight capability. These benefits, however, will not be
realized unless the industry is allowed to take risks and grow. Given the
likelihood of crippling liability from passengers injured or killed in the event
of an accident, especially if a court deems the entity a common carrier, the
industry needs support at the national level. It is imperative that the govern-
ment erect a time-limited immunity shield to federal tort liability to effec-
tively protect and support the industry until it is on a solid foundation.
157. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
159. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 100A.002.
160. See supra notes 122–123 and accompanying text.
